Inthisfinancialcrisis,realestatehasbeenhithardand,in turn, real estate has hit individual homeowners, the financial sector,andtheoveralleconomy.Infact,thelossesinresidential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were the proximate cause of themeltdownofthefinancialsysteminthefallof2008.Preceding this,thebubbleinrealestateassetsanddebtlaidthegroundwork for the eventual crash. Despite extraordinary countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy, as of the third quarter, housing continues to be a negative force. As of mid-year 2009, home priceshavefallenapproximately30percentfromtheir peakand the stock market has plummeted twice as much.
1 Because the financial sector is exposed to commercial and residential mortgages, banking and the economy depend fundamentally on thestabilityofrealestate.
The root of the crisis: homeowners who could not make payments falling into foreclosure and the lenders putting these homes up for sale at fire sale prices, resulted in an increase in supply. This pushed down real estate values, which left many other homeowners with negative equity-their homes were worth less than they owed on their mortgages. Paying a mortgageonapropertywithnegativeequityiseconomicrenting, andwithcheaperrentalratesmanyhomeownerswhootherwise would continue making payments despite financial reversals simply stopped making their mortgage payments and walked awayfromtheirproperties,feedingmoreforeclosures(Figure1).
2 More fuel was thrown on this fire as the economy declined. As unemployment rose more mortgages became unaffordable, resultinginmoreforeclosures,andfurtherprice declinesleading tomorenegativeequity. 
Figure1.GrowthinForeclosures

I.THENEWSECURITIZATION
The economic circumstances that contributed to the recenthousingmarketboomandbustarenotunique inhistory. Realestateboomsandsubsequentbankingcrasheshaveoccurred intheU.S.andelsewhere,intheearly1980sinJapan,inthelate 1980s in the savings and loan crisis and as recently as the late 1990s in the Asian Financial Crisis. Moreover, the housing boom that preceded this crisis was global. Nonetheless, this time the asset and credit bubble blowout and subsequent crash were Made in the USA. Downturns in the mortgage and housing marketshavecausedeconomicproblemsbefore,butthecurrent situation is the first of its kind and severity, underscoring profoundchangesinthesemarkets.
At the root of the mortgage problem was a new class of specialized mortgage lenders and securitizers unrestricted by regulations governing traditional lending and securitization. Historically,themortgagemarketwasdominatedbysavingsand loans and commercial banks. Both of these types of entities either held mortgages in portfolio or securitized them through government-sponsoredentities(GSEs):FannieMae,FreddieMac, andGinnieMae.BecausetheGSEsguaranteethetimelypayment of principal and interest on their MBS, they are permitted to securitize only "investment-grade" mortgages. This meant that lenders who made non-investment grade loans were forced to keep the mortgages-and the credit risk-on their books. Not surprisingly,lendershadlittleappetiteformakingriskierloans.
The balance of the mortgage market began to change, however, in the mid-1990s and a rapid transformation occurred after 2000. Lenders discovered that rather than securitizing mortgagesthroughtheGSEs,theycouldsecuritizethemthrough unregulated, private conduits managed by investment banks. These "private-label" MBS did not carry the GSE's guarantee of timely payment of principal and interest; instead, investors assumed the credit risk on these MBS, which meant on the underlyingmortgages.Theseoriginationdemandoftheseprivate conduits were feed heavily by thinly regulated mortgage banks andmortgagebrokers.
Because private label MBS do not have the payment guarantee (with implicit or explicit government backing) of the GSEs, they were designed with other forms of credit enhancement,mostnotablythedivisionofthesecuritiesbacked by a pool of mortgages into a cashflow waterfall that allocated default risk on the mortgages by a hierarchy of "tranches." The result was the creation of AAA securities from risky underlying mortgages.Theriskiesttranchesreceivedthelowestratingsfrom the credit rating agencies and therefore paid the highest yields, and they were the first to lose value if borrowers fell behind in payments. On top of this, financial firms leveraged private label MBSbyusingtheseascollateralforadditionaldebt,intheformof collateralizeddebtobligations(CDOs).FirmsoftenmadeCDOs 2 by pooling and tranching CDOs themselves. Leverage on top of leverageleftthesystemvulnerabletoeventheslightestdeclinein pricesorincreaseinloandefaults.
The rating agencies, did not carefully analyze the underlyingcollateralofthesecuritiestoidentifytheprobabilityof default or price fluctuation. Instead, they assumed home prices would not decline by much, if at all. Since the U.S. had never experienced an economy-wide decrease in home prices of more than 1 percent, the agencies considered this to be a reasonable assumption, and the firms issuing the securities assumed their diversificationhadremovedanyriskofconsiderablelosses.
This "private-label" securitization permitted the securitizationofnon-investmentgrademortgages,andtherewas a market appetite for private-label MBS because of the higher yields they offered relative to GSE MBS. The development of a market for non-investment grade mortgages led to a boom in their production. From the mid-1990s to 2006, nontraditional (nonprime) mortgages grew from virtually zero to nearly 50 percentoforiginations.Manyofthenewloanswereweremade to borrowers who could not qualify for traditional mortgages because of poor credit or low incomes. Many were also originated by mortgage banks or mortgage brokers who did not holdloansinportfolio,andwhosebusinesswassolelygenerating mortgageproductforprivate-labelsecuritizationpipelines.
Lendingqualityforprivate-labelsecuritizationwasdifficult tomonitoranddeclinedovertime.Becausethesesecuritieswere not backed by standardized assets, they generally did not trade. Private-label securities (PLS), as opposed to those issued by the GSEs, were not traded because they were non-standardized and therefore illiquid. PLS were therefore marked to model, not to market. Evidence of misallocated investment and growing risk wasmaskedbythefactthatthelooserstandardsbuoyedhousing pricesintheshortterm. Moreover the erosion of lending standards was nearly impossibletoidentifyinrealtimebecausemortgageswerenonstandardizedandheterogeneous.Giventhisheterogeneity,itwas notpossibletotrackthechangeinthecompositionofmortgage product or the layering of risk. And because these were not traded, there was no ability to signal this credit erosion to the market. The price bubble fueled by poor underwriting increased the risk exposure of the entire mortgage system given the inevitablecollapseofinflatedprices.Homepricesplummetedso sharply that by the spring of 2009, some have estimated that everyfifthborrowerowedmorethanhisorherhomewasworth and defaults rose to postwar records: almost one out of every twenty-fiveborrowersisinforeclosure.Financialinstitutionswith majormortgagemarketexposurehavefailedorrequiredextreme government assistance, and even AAA-rated MBS tranches are trading for a fraction of face because of market uncertainty regardingfuturedefaults.Thisisthesystemicriskengenderedby securitizationwithoutregulation.
TableI.DeteriorationofLendingStandards,2002-2006
MortgageInformation AllLoans
II.NONTRADITIONAL(NONPRIME)MORTGAGES
In an era of deregulation and optimism, private-label securitizationdrovethedemandfornewtypesofriskymortgages. For the past half-century, the classic U.S. mortgage charged a fixedinterestratethatstayedthesamefortheloan's30-yearlife. Once the mortgage papers were signed, the homeowner's monthly payments never changed, making payments easier and easier to shoulder as the borrower's income rose with inflation. Generally, homevalueswentupaswell,sothe borrowerscould expecttosellatvirtuallyanytimeformorethantheyowed.
This picture changed dramatically in the run-up to the housingbubbleasthedemandforsecuritizedmortgagesfedthe demandforrecklesslyunderwrittenloans.Initially,MBSinvolved only "prime" mortgages issued to low-risk borrowers, but then private label securitizers entered the market to pool mortgages backed by increasingly risky loans that the GSEs were not permitted to securitize. Prior to 2003, nontraditional (nonprime) mortgages never held more than 16 percent of the market; by 2006,theyhadreachedastaggering46percent(Figure2) .Nearly two-thirdsofallhomeloansissuedsince2003were"aggressive," entailing risks not found in conventional loans. In addition to subprime loans,this includednon-amortizing,interest-onlyloans where the borrower made no principal payments; "low doc" or "no doc" loans that required little or no down payment, documentation, or proof of income; and pay option adjustablerate mortgages (ARMs) that allowed borrowers to choose the monthly payment level, including making interest only or negativelyamortizingpayments.
Figure2.MortgageOriginationsbyProduct
At the same time, the subprime market developed new products whose features had never faced a market test. This included "hybrid ARMs", often known as 2/28 and 3/27 loans-30-yearloanswithafixedrateteaserperiodoftwoorthreeyears andannuallyadjustedratesthereafter.Theycarriedprepayment penalties making it prohibitively expensive for borrowers to refinance when their payments got too high, such as at the expiration of the teaser period. Buyers qualified based on the initial low "teaser" rate, even though they might not be able to shoulder the higher payments that could come if the rate adjustedupward.
The race for market share fueled the extension of increasingly risky loans to borrowers without the capacity to repay. The expansion of these aggressive loans beyond their suitable use is the real concern. Alt-A loans, for example, are riskier than prime but less riskythan subprime,. As a result they are niche products well-targeted to self-employed homeowners. Similarly, option ARMs were originally designed for individuals withirregularincome(suchascommissions,seasonalearnings,or year-endbonuses),notasageneralmarketproduct.
Aggressive lenders piled in by offering loans with low upfrontcosts,attractingfirst-timehomebuyerspreviouslyunable toaffordhouses,repeatbuyersbuyingpricierhomesandsecond homes, as well as speculators. Aggressive lending drove prices particularlyhighinArizona,California,Florida,andNevada,which had significant land-use regulations and environmental controls that reduced supply elasticity, leading increases in demand to triggermostlyhigherpricesinsteadofagreatersupplyofhousing.
By 2007, it was clear that neighborhoods and cities that hadhighconcentrationsofaggressivelendingsufferedthelargest home-price declines after the market cooled. For each onepercent higher share of subprime origination in 2005, prices declined increased by 1.5 percent for that neighborhood.
4 This was especially ominous for both inner-city and far-out "drive to qualify"neighborhoodswhereaggressiveloanswereprevalent.
Foratime,capitalmarketshadanappetiteforalmostany kindofrisk,aslongasparticipantsreceivedfeesfortheproducts they were manufacturing and selling. There was little understandingofthedefaultriskinthenew,fast-growingmarket, andfirmsdidnothaveastrongincentivetofocusondefaultrisk. The bulk of new products were "originate-to-distribute," so they were sold off instead of held in firms' portfolios. The issuer, the securitizerandtheraterwereonlyinterestedinthefeesthatthey bookedforeachsale,whichofcourselentitselftoahighvolume of short-term profits instead of calibration of default risk and long-termloanperformance.
III.ADEBT-DRIVENPHENOMENON
There are three common explanations for Wall Street's drivetowardMBSandtheincredibleappreciationofhomeprices (Figure3).Thefirstisastoryofeasymoneylookingfortrouble.
5 It argues that the low interest rates set by the Greenspan Federal Reserve made borrowing so cheap that consumers rationally bought houses in droves. This explains part, but not all, of the bubble. Low interest rates allowed people to borrow more, bidding up home prices. Because home prices soared, homeownerswhoranintofinancialtroublecouldeasilyselltheir homes for more than they owed, avoiding default and foreclosure.
Figure3.HomePriceIndex(Case-Shiller)
Interest rates do not tell the whole story, though. Even while the Fed was lowering interest rates, the rest of the world was experiencing the same cheap credit. By 2003, U.S. interest rates began to rise, and home price appreciation slowed throughout the world-except in the U.S., where home prices continuedtoacceleratedespiterisinginterestrates.Cheapcredit 5 Adam J. Levitin helps explain the beginning of the boom, but the magnitude of thebubble-and-burstcyclerequiresafullerexplanation.
Thesecondexplanation,advocatedbyEdGlaeser,Joseph Gyourko,andAlbertSaiz,arguesthatsupplyhasbecomeinelastic intheUnitedStates,soincreaseddemandbidpricesthroughthe roof instead of increasing the quantity supplied.
6 While this is certainlytrue(asindicatedinthediscussionoftheeffectofland useregulations),thishousingfocusignorestheroleofthesupply ofcapital,alinkwhichwewilladdressshortly.Arelatedrationale has been put forth by Robert Shiller that "irrational exuberance"-or"animalspirits,"tousethetermheandGeorge Akerlof borrowed from John Maynard Keynes-blinded consumers to the bubble, so they bid prices higher and higher, thinkingtheywouldneverfall.
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The third explanation pins the blame on the affordable housing policies of the GSEs and the Community Reinvestment Act. This argument holds that government encouragement of homeownershipincentivizedfinancialinstitutionstomakeriskier loans, with disastrous results.
8 It is important to remember, however, that regulation prevented the GSEs from issuing MBS basedonsubprimemortgages.Infact,theGSEsdidnotarriveon the subprime scene until 2005-well after the bubble had begun-and then only by buying so-called "AAA" and Alt-A tranches of subprime CDOs for their portfolio. In this regard, shareholdersandCongressdeservetheblameforpressuringthe GSEs in this direction, and their safety and soundness regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 6 Edward L. Glaeser et al., Housing Supply and Housing Bubbles, at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/bubbles10-jgeditsNBER%20version-July%2016,%202008.pdf (July16,2008draft deserves the blame for not stopping them (though, in fairness, Congress gave OFHEO very little power to do so). The GSEs thereforeaddedalotoffueltoanalreadyragingfire,byaddingto the demand for subprime MBS, but bear less responsibility for startingthecrisis.
Two of us-Andrey Pavlov and Susan Wachter-have offered a fourth explanation: because the price of risk (represented by the yield rates of MBS) fell during the housing bubble,wecannotconcludethatitwassimplyarightwardshiftin the demand curve for housing, as the first two explanations suggest, or else increased demand would have generated higher rates for MBS.
9 Instead, it must be the case that supply of mortgage capital increased more than demand, which is consistent with the observed lower cost of capital according to standard economic theory. Specifically, Wall Street firms must havebeensupplyingMBSatsuchahighpacethatitexceededthe high demand for houses. In other words, the demand for mortgages,whichdrovehighhomeprices,wasledbyWallStreet, whichneededthemtocreateandsellMBS.Why,then,wasWall StreetsoeagertoproduceMBS?
Short-term incentives-such as origination-focused compensation packages and trader bonuses geared toward endof-year revenues instead of any long run measure of performance-encouraged financialfirmstosell MBSforaquick profitatarapidpaceand highvolume.Thecreditboomcreated by the Fed, as earlier suggested, played an important role in initiatingthepriceappreciation,butWallStreet'shungerformore mortgages ratified it. The mortgage crisis was born of both a demand-side and a supply-side boom that led to a real-time erosioninlendingstandards.
IV.NON-RECOURSELENDING
Because most American mortgages are effectively nonrecourse, 10 a borrower who defaults stands to lose only the collateral-thatis,thehouse-andanyequitytheyhaveputinto thehouse(which isasunkcostanyway).Theborrower,inother words, is not personally liable for the full amount of the loan in default.Anotherwaytolookatthisstructureisthroughthelens of a put option. When a bank makes a non-recourse loan, it implicitly provides a put option on the underlying asset. If the valueoftheassetdeclines,theborrowerhastheright,butnotthe obligation,to"put"theassetbacktothebank(thatis,walkaway from the property). In other words, the borrower can "sell" the assettothebankfortheoutstandingloanbalance.This"rightto sell"limitsthelossesoftheborrowerandisaputoption,written by the bank, with a strike price equal to the outstanding loan balance.
Iftheputoptionispricedcorrectly,anditspriceispassed ontotheborrowerintermsofahigherinterestrate,lendinghas no impact on asset prices, that is, property values. If the put option imbedded in a loan is underpriced, that is, if the interest ratechargedistoolowrelativetothedepositrate,theninvestors incorporatethismistakeintheirdemandpricefortheasset.Thus lendingwithoutproperlypricingtheputoptionresultsininflated price of the asset even within efficient equity markets. Once lenders began to issue mortgages with loan-to-value ratios greater than one, mortgages were almost "in-the-money" put optionsimmediatelyatthepointoforigination.
Managers' inability to correctly value the put option results in underpricing, but managers who underprice the put option are discovered only in case of financial crisis when homeownersarelikelytoexercisetheoption.Absentsuchcrisis, managershaveanincentivetounderpricetheputoptioninorder toincreasetheprofitsingoodstates.Long-termmanagershavea lottoloseiftheyunderpriceandarediscovered.Thus,long-term managerswouldnotunderprice.Short-termmanagers,however, haverelativelylittletoloseiftheirunderpricingisdiscovered.For them,thebenefitofincreasedprofitsintheshortrunissufficient tounderprice.Infact,aswehavepreviouslyshown,thepresence of short-term managers puts sufficient competitive pressure on the industry that all managers underprice the put option, regardless of their time horizon. 11 This result holds even if managers act in the best interest of shareholders, absent any agencyconflicts.
Theabsenceofshortsellinginrealestateandtheabilityof optimists to drive prices up can, for example, produce price bubbles even in the absence of underpricing, but mortgage funding is necessary to sustain real estate price bubbles. The willingness and ability of the banking sector to provide underpricedfundingratifiesandexacerbatestheseinefficiencies.
V.MISALIGNEDINCENTIVES
Thekeylinkinthechain,asdescribedabove,istheshortterm perspective of managers. If managers had reason to worry about the franchise value of the firm, they would not risk a financialcrisisbyunderpricingMBS.Severalfactorscontributedto thisperspective.
First,thecompensationstructureatmostWallStreetfirms focusedonyear-endbonusesbasedonannualprofits.Managers neededtoproduceahighvolumeofprofitsbeforeDecember31, and had no incentive to consider the systemic risk that underpricingMBSmightleadtoanunsustainablehousingbubble.
Second,therewasnowayto"keepthemarkethonest."In complete markets, traders can recognize underpricing and short 11 See Pavlov and Wachter (2006) , Wachter (2009a), and PavlovandWachter(2009c). sell the firms and assets to profit from the long-term default of the system. Real estate, however, is famously difficult, if not impossible, to short. Because financial firms kept MBS in their portfolios, they were not actively traded. Without a trading marketforMBSs,shortsellingcannotoccur.Withoutshortselling, themarketcannotindicateorcorrectunderpricing.
Also,firmsattemptedtohedgetheirriskbybuyingcredit default swaps (CDS) from insurance firms like AIG and some investment banks like Lehman Brothers. CDS insured the buyer againstdefaultonaparticularunrelatedtransaction-inthiscase, the mortgages underlying MBS held in the banks' portfolios. A CDSbuyerpaysafeeforCDSprotection,andifthereisadefault, the CDS seller essentially purchases the defaulted debt from the protection buyer at a previously agreed price. Because the CDS buyersfeltthattheyhadhedgedtheirdownsiderisk,theyhadan incentivetocontinuetounderpriceMBS.
Unfortunately, the firms underwriting CDS also underpricedrisk.Oneofaninsurer'sprimarydutiesistoanalyze theircounterpartyrisktodetermineasufficientpremiumtocover any eventual payments; for CDS, that means understanding the riskprofileofthetransactionsbeinginsured.Why,then,didCDS sellers like AIG and CDS buyers like Lehman fail in their primary duty? ManagersatCDSfirms,likemanagersatMBSissuers,had a compensation structure that rewarded short-term revenues insteadoflong-termperformance.SellingCDSnowandworrying about risk later was a profitable strategy. Buying CDS now and worrying about counterparty risk later was also a profitable strategy.Furthermore,CDSbuyersmayhaveconsideredmostof their counterparties "too big to fail," and so there was a moral hazard in the system that encouraged CDS sellers to issue more insurancethantheycouldcoverinthebeliefthatanyremaining losseswouldbesocialized.
The system was essentially insolvent. Firms had underpricedMBSandcouldnotsustainthelossesofaneconomywide housing crash. They had bought and sold CDS that did not really hedge their risk, as the buyers would be stuck with losses they could not pay, and the sellers would be forced to insure defaultsthattheydidnothavesufficientcollateraltocover.The result was a run on the bank in reverse: Managers had an incentive to "get it while you can." It was the classic looting behaviordescribedbyGeorgeAkerlofandPaulRomer.
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VI.THENEWNEWSECURITIZATION
While it is clear that systemic risk derives from the procyclical erosion of lending standards, there is no consensus on how to avoid this. While no system is perfect, fixed-rate longterm mortgages with robust, standardized securitization historically has been consistent with financial stability. Standardization promotes liquidity, ensures suitability, and enhances system stability. A market and a formal trading exchange for standardizing and, if necessary, short selling real estate securities could be helpful in bringing increased liquidity, decreasedheterogeneity,andtheabilitytorecognizeandprevent creditmispricing.Butmoreisnecessary. Asset bubbles that affect the payment mechanism have repeatedlyledtoliquiditycrises.Realestateisespeciallyproneto assetbubblesbecauseofthedifficultyinshortingtheunderlying asset. Real estate bubbles are a matter of particular concern becausefinancialintermediarieslikebanksareheavilyexposedto residentialandcommercialmortgagesmakingtheentirefinancial system susceptible to real estate booms and busts. Relying on a macro-prudential risk regulator may not be sufficient. Securitization has become an essential component of consumer finance and of housing finance in particular. But to make securitizationwork,clearrulesofthegameareneededthathelp achieve transparency, assure against counterparty risk and data provisiontoinformtrading.Marketscanpriceandexposerisk,if wegivethemtothetoolstodoso.
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